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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
K. RUSSELL MYERS 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
TAWNYA MYERS (LUKE) 
Defendant/Respondent 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Civil No. D 85-1828 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this 
matter pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. Section 78-
2a-3(g) (1987) and Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On October 14, 1986, the defendant filed a Motion for Order 
Permitting Minors to Leave State to permit her to move from the 
State of Utah with the parties1 minor children. On December 23, 
1987 the plaintiff filed a Motion for Immediate Change of Custody 
and Determination of Contempt against defendant. A trial on both 
Motions was held on February 10, 1987. The plaintiff/appellant 
has filed this appeal from the decision denying the plaintiff's 
motion and granting the defendant's rendered by the Third 
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Michael R. Murphy presiding as announced after trial in 
open court on February 26, 1987. 
ISSUES PRESENTED BY RESPONDENT 
1 . Did the trial court err by allowing the defendant to 
maintain her residence in the State of Washington with the 
parties' minor children and was that move and change of locale 
part of the Court's determination that for the Defendant to 
maintain custody of the children was in the said children's best 
interests? 
2. Did the trial court err in awarding defendant custody of 
the parties' minor children? 
3. Did the trial court err by not finding the Defendant in 
contempt for leaving the State of Utah without court approval? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In May of 1985 an action for divorce was filed by the 
Plaintiff. (R. 2) One of the issues raised in said complaint was 
that of custody of the parties two minor children. Custody 
evaluations were completed by Kim Peterson (Ex. 3-P) and 
psychological evaluations were performed by Barbara Liebrocer. 
(Ex. 4-P) Kim Peterson recommended that custody be awarded to 
Defendant (Tawnya) stating that the Plaintiff (Russ) 
"has a history of infidelity and data 
indicates he is abusive when pushed to 
the limits. . . . Tawnya has been more 
involved with the children and has been 
the primary caretaker. The bonding 
between Melanie and her mother appears 
to be stronger, and she seems to prefer 
living with her mother. 
Since Tawnya has been in the role 
of primary parent and given her relative 
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strengths as well as the perceived bonding 
between her and the children, it is 
recommended custody remain with the mother 
. . . To disrupt the current situation 
without evidence that the children would be 
better off with Russ is clearly not in the 
children's best interest. (Ex. 3-P) 
Dr. Liebroder did not examine the children and thus was "not 
in a position to assess which parent is better able to met the 
needs11 of the children though stating it was "preferable to avoid 
the disruption of a change in custody." (Ex. 4-P) On the date 
of trial the parties entered into a stipulation which was made 
part of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce. (R. 99-118) As part of the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce the parties agreed that 
the Defendant would be awarded the custody of the parties' minor 
children and she would reside within 50 miles of Salt Lake County 
and that she would not move from the area without the permission 
of the Plaintiff or of the Court. (R. 100-101) 
On or about August 14, 1986 the Defendant caused to be 
served on the Plaintiff a Motion for permission to move from the 
State of Utah with the children. (R. 138) The matter was set 
for hearing twice in the month of October, 1986 but was continued 
so that custody evaluations could be performed. (Tr. 3-5) 
On or about December 13, 1986, after attempting on numerous 
occasions without success to contact Plaintiff's counsel to 
obtain permission to leave the State of Utah, and after the 
hearing set for December 12, 1986 was continued (the third such 
continuance) the Defendant moved to Washington with the parties1 
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minor children. (Tr. 185, 176-178) 
On or about December 23, 1986 the Plaintiff filed a Motion 
for Immediate Change of Custody and Determination of Contempt. 
(R. 153) All issues made part of said motion were reserved for 
time of trial. (R. 159-162) 
Trial was held on February 10, 1982. Dr. Barbara Liebroder, 
Kim Peterson, Tawnya Luke, Garth Luke, and Russell Myers 
testified at the trial. 
The Defendant, Mrs. Luke, testified that she left without 
Court order because she had not been able to contact counsel to 
obtain permission. She testified that she had lost her job in 
Salt Lake County, that she had no income since the Plaintiff had 
refused to pay child support, the last payment having been 
received on November 3, 1986. The Plaintiff further testified 
that she was residing with her parents and driving 120 miles 
every day to ensure that her daughter regained in school. She 
had given up her apartment in anticipation of the December court 
date. Mrs Luke was at the time of her departure for Washington 
in her third trimester of pregnancy and was anxious to move to 
Washington where her husband was working. (Tr. 176-178) 
Mr. Luke, the husband of the Defendant, testified that the 
income he was able to earn in the State of Washington allowed the 
Defendant now to stay home full-time and be a full-time caretaker 
of the children. (Tr. 188) 
Dr. Liebroder recommended that custody of the children be 
awarded to the plaintiff because she stated that Defendant's 
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stability had deteriorated and that Plaintiff had made 
significant gains. However Dr. Liebroder acknowledged that 
Plaintiff had problems with immaturity, difficulty controlling 
his temper, and had a history of sexual acting out. (Tr. 24) 
She further acknowledged that if the Plaintiff were granted 
custody the children would require babysitters (Tr. 57) and that 
her concerns regarding the parties1 minor child, Nathan, and his 
aggression may have been causing by his observing the Plaintiff 
abuse the Defendant. (Tr. 60) During her testimony Dr. 
Liebroder acknowledged that the stresses which were indicated in 
her recent testing of the Defendant may have been caused by 
Defendant's pregnancy, living with her parents, unemployment, and 
her separation from her husband. (Tr. 58, 86) Dr. Liebroder 
agreed that the Defendant/Respondent had been the primary 
caretaker during the marriage and the children had a strong bond 
to their mother. (Tr. 80-82) Further Dr. Liebroder testified 
that the Plaintiff had rehabilitated himself through therapy but 
that he was not currently married nor had the custody of the 
children and therefore was not under any stress from such. (Tr. 
24, 50, 63). However Plaintiff was anticipating being married 
and had a profile inconsistent with marital stability. (Tr. 63) 
Also the minor child Nathan had expressed to Dr. Liebroder fears 
of separation from his mother. (Tr. 54) 
Kim Peterson reported that in is opinion the Defendant 
should maintain custody of the parties1 minor children. 
(Ex. 1-P) He stated that it is difficult to tell if the 
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Plaintiff will revert to his past history of sexual acting out 
and abusive behavior if again placed in a position of stress as a 
result of marriage. (Tr. 127) Mr. Peterson testified that the 
fact that the Defendant can now be with the children essentially 
24 hours a day weighed heavily in his recommendation that she 
retain custody. (Tr. 128) He further noted that the bond with 
mother is stronger and that she had been the primary caretaker. 
(Tr. 128-129) Mr. Peterson stated that in weighing the two 
possibilities of either having the Defendant come back to Utah 
and financially have to resume full-time employment or having the 
Defendant stay in Washington and be a full-time caretaker, the 
better circumstance would be that the Defendant stay in 
Washington and be a full-time mother. Mr. Peterson stated that 
he had intentionally not reviewed the reports of Dr. Liebroder 
because his report was to be independent of Dr. Liebroder fs. 
(Tr. 143, 144) 
The trial court, by and through the Honorable Judge Michael 
Murphy, ruled that it would be in the best interests of the 
children for the Defendant to maintain custody of the children 
and the Court in awarding custody to the Defendant took into 
account the fact that the children would continue to reside out 
of the State of Utah. Judge Murphy stated when announcing his 
ruling in open court on February 26, 1987, "I did not condition 
the order on Mrs. Luke's residing in Utah. To the extent I can I 
don't want to create additional marital problems and I just donft 
think that is appropriate.'1 (Tr. 212) Judge Murphy also 
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required, and went to great lengths to ensure, that modification 
of visitation was made to allow continued visitation rights for 
the Plaintiff out of the State of Utah, and even apportioned 
responsibility for the costs of transporting the children from 
state to state between the parties. (Tr. 205-208) 
The Defendant/Respondent considers the following Findings of 
Fact probative in her response to the appeal filed by the 
Plaintiff/Appellant: 
4. Defendant filed a Motion for Permission to Leave the 
State of Utah based on defendants husband's employment, but when 
the hearing of said motion was continued, defendant removed 
herself and the minor children to the State of Washington without 
the court's permission and in knowing violation of the Order of 
this Court. 
5. As a further and changed circumstance, the plaintiff has 
undergone therapy in an effort to improve the emotional problems 
he was advised existed when the original custody evaluations were 
performed. 
6. Plaintiff has acted in the best interests of the 
children of the parties. 
7. Defendant's stability has degenerated since the entry of 
the Decree of Divorce herein, a large part of which degeneracy 
has been caused by post-divorce problems. 
8. Dr. Barbara Liebroder has conducted psychological and 
custodial evaluations on the parties, their children, the husband 
of defendant and the girlfriend of plaintiff, and concluded it 
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would be in the best interests of the parties1 minor children for 
the plaintiff to be awarded the care, custody and control of said 
minor children even though the minor children are bonded to the 
defendant, the defendant has been primary caretaker of said 
children and can spend more time with said children. 
9. Kim Peterson, MSW, LCSW, recommended that it would be in 
the best interests of the parties1 minor children for the 
defendant to retain custody of the said minor children based upon 
the findings of plaintiff's prior conduct and psychological 
reports, and based upon the defendant's being a full-time 
caretaker, having bonded with said children, and to avoid 
unnecessary trauma to the children of a change of custodial 
parent. He also recommended that the first choice of action in 
the best interest of the children would be that they remain in 
Salt Lake City, Utah with the defendant as their custodial 
parent. If that was not the order of the court, then it was 
slightly better that they remain in the custody of the Defendant 
and reside in Washington than if custody was transferred to 
plaintiff. 
10. The court finds that the parties1 minor child, Nathan, 
is hyperactive and is in need of therapy and that continued 
psychological reports of Nathan's progress should be provided to 
the court and to plaintiff. 
11. It is reasonable that the parties should equally divide 
the cost of therapy for the minor child, Nathan. 
12. The court finds that both parents are fit and proper 
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persons to be awarded custody of said minor children. 
13. The court finds that it is in the best interest of the 
parties1 minor children to remain in the custody of the defendant 
who is a full-time caretaker and who has bonded with said 
children, and that it would not be in the best interest of said 
children to change custody. 
17. The plaintiff should be awarded a specific minimum 
visitation schedule with the parties1 minor children based upon 
said children residing out of the State of Utah as follows: 
a. Monthly visitation of at least one weekend with 
reasonable prior notice, no less than two weeks before 
visitation; 
b. Two (2) months during the summer, upon sixty (60) 
days prior notice; 
c. Christmas vacation commencing the day before 
Christmas Day and the day after Christmas Day on alternating 
years running until January 2nd of each year; 
d. Alternate Thanksgiving or Easter Holiday visitation 
with plaintiff electing which holiday to commence with in 1987; 
e. Holiday vacations should be upon prior notice of at 
least thirty (30) days; 
f. Prior notice of intent to exercise visitation 
should be made in writing; 
g. The Plaintiff should be entitled to free telephone 
access to the parties1 minor children. 
18. It is reasonable that the defendant should notify the 
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plaintiff when the parties' minor children are visiting with the 
children's grandparents in Salt Lake City, Utah so that plaintiff 
may visit with said children during such visits. 
21 . The court finds that plaintiff is past due in the 
payment of his child support obligation for the months of 
December, 1986 and January and February, 1987. 
22. The defendant should be granted judgment against the 
plaintiff in the sum of $1,350.00 (retroactive from court date) 
for said past due support, provided that no execution should be 
issued on said judgment as long as the plaintiff makes his 
ordered child support payments each month plus $100.00 on the 
arrearage until it is paid in full. 
26. Plaintiff's motion to hold defendant in contempt should 
be denied. 
These conditions were incorporated into the Court's Order. 
(R. 185 and 188) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Point I 
Pursuant to stipulation an Order was entered by the Court 
requiring the Defendant to petition the Court to move the 
children from the State of Utah. A Motion for Permission to 
Leave the State of Utah was served upon Plaintiff by the 
Defendant in August, 1986. The matter was heard before the Court 
in February, 1987. The Plaintiff/Appellant argues that the trial 
court erred in awarding custody of the children to the Defendant 
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withou t de termining t h a t the move was in the ch i ld ren ' s best 
i n t e r e s t . Defendant/Respondent contends that the t r i a l court 
d i d i n d e e d c o n s i d e r t h e move and in i t s Findings of Fact 
considered the move in determining and finding that i t was in the 
best i n t e r e s t s of the children for them to remain in the custody 
of the Defendant. The Court subs tan t ia l ly modified and included 
p r o v i s i o n s f o r o u t - o f - s t a t e v i s i t a t i o n and c o s t s of 
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n showing t h e r e was an u n d e r s t a n d i n g and 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the ou t -o f - s ta te move in determining the best 
i n t e r e s t s of the chi ldren. 
The t r i a l cour t did not e r r in awarding custody to the 
Defendant. The t r i a l court has broad d i sc re t ion in determining 
the best i n t e r e s t s of chi ldren. 
Point II 
The t r i a l court did not err in not finding the Defendant in 
con tempt under t h e e x i g e n t s t r e s s e s and c i rcumstances the 
Defendant was under. The continued court da tes , pregnancy, loss 
of j o b , f a i l u r e of P l a i n t i f f to pay support , separation from 
husband, loss of residence and t ranspor ta t ion of the children 120 
miles per day to school, a l l placed the Defendant under extreme 
s t r e s s dur ing the per iod between August and December, 1986. 
Fu r the r the Defendant exhibited her wil l ingness to comply with 
the Court order by f i l ing her motion for permission and waiting 
for a period of four months for a hearing to take place. 
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ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT CONFORMED WITH 
AND COMPLIED WITH THE STIPULATION MADE 
PART OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE AND THE 
COURT CONSIDERED THE MOVE OF THE DEFENDANT 
AND THE PARTIES1 CHILDREN IN DETERMINING 
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN AND 
ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING 
CUSTODY TO THE DEFENDANT. 
The Appellant argues that the Court failed to make a finding 
of best interests of the children to be located out of the State 
of Utah. Appellant argues that this matter came on for hearing 
as a result of his Motion for Immediate Change of Custody and 
Determination of Contempt. Respondent contends that this matter 
was heard as a result of the filing of her Motion to Move from 
the State of Utah filed three m o n t h ' s before 
Plaintiff /Appellant' s Motion and some two and one-half (2 1/2) 
months before the Defendant/Respondent left the State of Utah. 
The Defendant/Respondent did not attempt to avoid the 
requirements of the stipulation and Decree that she procure a 
court order before being permitted to move. Immediately upon 
determining that her husband had to relocate out of the State of 
Utah, Defendant/Respondent served upon Plaintiff, in August, 
1986, a Motion to Move as required by the Decree of Divorce. 
This matter had been set for hearing three times and continued 
three times before Plaintiff filed his Motion for Custody and 
Contempt. 
Appellant cites the precedents incorporated in Despain vs. 
Despain 627 P.2d. 526 (Utah 1980) and Kinsman v. Kinsman 73 Utah 
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Adv. Rep. 110 (January 12, 1988). In Despain the modification 
filed by the Respondent dealt with the value of a trust fund. In 
Kinsman the court dealt with a stipulated waiver of alimony 
incorporated in a divorce decree. In these cases the petitioner 
moved that the court disregard previous stipulations entered into 
by the parties. In this case at hand the Defendant/Respondent 
did not move that the court disregard the stipulation. She 
specifically complied with the Court order in moving and having 
heard a Motion to move out of the State as required by the 
parties1 stipulation which stated: 
"That she would not move from that 
area without either the permission of the 
plaintiff or the Court obtained by 
petitioning the court for permission to 
leave the area and establishing that such 
move would be in the best interests of the 
children after evaluation by follow-up 
evaluation to be performed by Kim Peterson.'1 
(R. 100, 101 and 111) 
Follow-up evaluations were performed by Kim Peterson and Dr. 
Liebroder as required under the terms of the stipulation. Both 
evaluators testified at the hearing held in February, 1987 and 
the Court had the benefit of said testimony in making its 
determination. The Defendant/Respondent transported and provided 
the children and submitted herself and her husband to all testing 
and evaluations required by the evaluators appointed by the 
Court. 
As a result of the stipulation entered into by the parties a 
determination of what would be in the best interests of the 
children was required be made by the Court. 
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By its action the trial court fulfills the proper standard 
for reviewing a change of custody as set out in Hogue v. Hogue, 
649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982). The standard requires that the trial 
court first determine whether there has been a substantial and 
material change in the circumstances which justifies reopening 
the question of custody. Id at 54. If this issue is resolved in 
the affirmative, the Court then proceeds to decide whether the 
requested change in custody will best serve the welfare of the 
child. Id. 
Under U.C.A., 1953, 30-3-5(3), as amended, a divorce court 
sits as a court of equity so far as child custody is concerned. 
The trial court is afforded particularly broad discretion in the 
area of child custody. In Hirsh v. Hirsh, 725 P.2d 132, (Ut. 
1986), the Supreme Court states that a determination of the "best 
interests of the child11 turns on factors which the trial court is 
best able to assess, and only when the action taken by the trial 
court is so unjust as to constitute an abuse of discretion should 
this Court substitute its own judgment. 
In Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019 (Ut. App. 1987), the 
Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion 
when awarding a former husband visitation, by failing to make 
findings in the best interests of the children. The Supreme 
Court based its decision on the fact that the trial court's 
findings were silent on the best interests of the children with 
regard to the visitation schedule. Moreover, the Court only 
makes mention of the intended move without any findings as to 
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whether the move would be in the childrens1 best interest. Id. 
at 1023. 
The trial court deficiencies alluded to in Ebbert are not 
repeated in the case before you. The trial court, in acting on 
respondent's Motion for Permission to Leave the State and 
appellant's Motion for Modification of the Divorce Decree 
commissioned a custody evaluation to be conducted by Kim Peterson 
and a psychological evaluation by Dr. Barbara Liebroder. Both 
witnesses had been associated with the parties in question since 
May 20, 1985 when the Appellant initiated the Complaint for 
dissolution of the parties' marriage, and were properly qualified 
to testify and aid the Court in determining the best interests of 
the children. 
Kim Peterson's report recommended that it would be in the 
best interest of the parties' children for the Respondent to 
retain custody of the children. Mr. Peterson based his 
recommendation on the strong bond formed between the children and 
their mother given her full-time caretaker status. He also 
stated that it would avoid unnecessary trauma to the children of 
a change of custodial parent. His report also took into account 
the move from one state to another since he concluded that the 
ideal situation would be that they remain in Utah with the 
respondent as custodial parent but if that was not the order of 
the court, then it was slightly better that they remain in the 
custody of respondent and reside in Washington than if custody 
was transferred to appellant. (R. 174). All the above reasons 
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and recommendations were echoed by the Court in the Findings. 
There are ample reasons and evidence upon which the Court's 
Findings were based. In child custody determinations, the trial 
court's decision should be upheld on appeal unless the trial 
court's action is so flagrantly unjust as to constitute an abuse 
of discretion. Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197 (Utah 1981). 
The evidence in this case clearly shows the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion. Dr. Liebroder and Mr. Peterson 
acknowledged that the Defendant had been the primary caretaker of 
the children and both acknowledged that the children were bonded 
to the defendant mother. The evidence showed that due to the 
move the defendant was now able to stay home and take care of the 
children on a full-time basis. The evaluators both testified 
that the plaintiff had a history of sexual acting out, abusive 
behavior and marital instability which might surface if exposed 
to ongoing stresses of remarriage or custody of the children, 
stresses he was not exposed to while undergoing testing and 
therapy. 
Point II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT HOLD 
RESPONDENT IN CONTEMPT FOR HER FAILURE 
TO COMPLY WITH THE PARTIES' STIPULATION. 
The Decree of Divorce entered in this matter on June 9, 1986 
awards the custody of the children to the respondent provided she 
remain in and reside within the jurisdiction of the Court. In 
order to leave the State of Utah, the respondent filed a Motion 
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for Permission to Leave the State of Utah based on her husband's 
employment in the State of Washington, Mr. Kim Peterson's 
evaluation supports the grounds for the Motion when he finds that 
respondent's husband worked in Seattle, Washington for a year and 
one-half as a sales manager and earned $42,000.00 per year. A 
return to Utah would cut is income in half and this would mean 
that respondent would have to seek employment thus depriving her 
of her full-time caretaker status as a mother. (Ex. 1) 
Respondent's Motion for Permission to Leave the State was 
continued on numerous occasions. At no time during the 
proceedings did respondent's actions impair the course of the 
process or hamper the Court's mandated evaluations. Throughout 
respondent attempted to fulfill all obligations by appearing in 
Court and having the children available. "One who puts forth 
every reasonable effort to comply with the court order, but is 
unable to do so, is not guilty of contempt on account of such 
failure." Limb v. Limb, 113 Utah 385, 195 P.2d 263 (1948). 
By analogy, Butler v. Butler, 461 P.2d 727 (Utah 1969) seems 
to illustrate the powers of the trial court. In Butler, even 
though the evidence strongly suggested Plaintiff's failure and 
refusal in every respect to cooperate with Defendant's efforts to 
see his children pursuant to the terms of the divorce decree, the 
Court did not hold the Plaintiff in contempt. Though Butler 
stands for the proposition that the "duty to hold contempt in a 
civil matter in order to afford relief to another party does not 
lie within the discretion of the trial court," Id at 729, the 
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trial judge is in a better position than the Supreme Court to 
make a determination in the matter. Id at 728* The trial court 
is obviously best situated to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses, and this court will not substitute its judgment for 
that of the trial court on a disputed factual issue. Hughes v. 
Stusser, 415 P.2d 89 (Utah 1963). 
The trial court heard evidence that the Defendant/Respondent 
was under extreme stresses and circumstances during the period 
before her move out of state, including the continuance of 
hearings on her Motion for Permission to Leave, the loss of her 
employment, her pregnancy, the failure of Plaintiff/Appellant to 
pay support, separation from her husband, loss of residence and 
subsequent residence with her parents, and the transporting of 
her daughter 120 miles each day to attend the same school. In 
taking such evidence into considering and denying 
Plaintiff/Appellantfs Motion to find Defendant/Respondent in 
contempt of Court the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
B a s e d u p o n t h e f o r e g o i n g p o i n t s a n d a u t h o r i t i e s , 
D e f e n d a n t / R e s p o n d e n t h e r e i n r e q u e s t s t h i s Cour t t o uphold t h e 
f i n d i n g s and r u l i n g s of t h e t r i a l c o u r t . 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s *f day of A p r i l , 1988 . 
HASKINS 
f o r D e f e n d a n t / R e s p o n d e n t 
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